



# Who are we?





Freelance researcher, CTF enjoyer, researcher at Midnight Blue





Carlo Meijer

Founding partner - Midnight Blue






# Acknowledgement



35C3 DEF CON 26 Eyal Itkin, Yaniv Balmas - What the Fax?!

**Checkpoint Security Research** 







- Oday competition
- Targets published 3 months in advance
- Different categories
  - Desktop software
  - o Automotive
  - o lot









#### **ZDI blog**

We're also excited to announce a special challenge for this year's contest we're calling the "SOHO Smashup" (as in Small Office/Home Office). This is a real-world scenario of how a threat actor would exploit a home office, so we wanted to include it here, too. It works like this; a contestant picks a router and begins by exploiting the WAN interface. They must then pivot into the LAN to their choice of second target – one of the other devices in the contest. For example, you could pick the TP-Link router and the HP printer. If you compromise both, you'll win \$100,000 and 10 Master of Pwn points.







- Printers have a large attack surface (later)
- We can choose a harder target to avoid duplicates with other teams
- Strategy: choose a reasonably cheap one with encrypted firmware image → competition drawn towards others

Target	Cash Prize
HP Color LaserJet Pro M479fdw	\$20,000 (USD)
Lexmark MC3224i	\$20,000 (USD)
Canon imageCLASS MF743Cdw	\$20,000 (USD)







# Meet our protagonist

- Pwn20wn target since 2021
- Exploited by us '22,' 23, '24
- Yocto-linux based
- Fairly decent security posture
- \* Fax support!















Fax Machines
© 1846-1999

Rick de Jager
© 1999-2024







#### Plan of the attack

- Obtain the firmware
- Get some debugging capability
  - JTAG/GDB
- Find vulnerable code
- Exploit the vulnerability
- · Get p20 ca\$h
- Repeat over fax, give cool CCC talk







#### From Lexmark's website:

```
        User@bluelagoon:/tmp$ binwalk CXLBL.081.215.fls

        DECIMAL
        HEXADECIMAL
        DESCRIPTION

        7716693
        0x75BF55
        MySQL ISAM index file Version 1

        29499865
        0x1C22109
        XAR archive, version: 28769, header size: 14349, TOC compressed: 11467389281180270267, TOC un

        40569430
        0x26B0A56
        Stuffit Deluxe Segment (data): f

        65470945
        0x3E701E1
        gzip compressed data, ASCII, has header CRC, last modified: 2068-04-23 16:49:31 (bogus date)

        99970506
        0x5F56DCA
        LANCOM DEM file

        134925613
        0x80ACD2D
        Nagra Constant_KEY IDEA_Key: 10192431 F6147288 643F945F
```

```
user@bluetagoon:/tmpt ent CXLBL.081.215.fls
Entroly = 7.999999 bit per byte.
Optimum compression would reduce the size
```

of this 151816071 byte file by 0 percent.

Chi square distribution for 151816071 samples is 267.31, and randomly would exceed this value 28.56 percent of the times.

Arithmetic mean value of data bytes is 127.4911 (127.5 = random). Monte Carlo value for Pi is 3.141488502 (error 0.00 percent). Serial correlation coefficient is 0.000103 (totally uncorrelated = 0.0). It's encrypted

Fun fact: printer firmware updates are provided to the printer a regular print jobs.













Back of my car



Seller

Me

Are you sure you want to buy this printer?

Of course. Why wouldn't I be?

The toners are running low. If you want to print you'll have to buy new ones soon and they're expensive.

Printing? Why would I want to do that?







- PCB has markings for JTAG
- · We can debug the device with this
  - · Set break points
  - Dump the firmware
  - Modify instructions in RAM
- Seems to talk, spit out the IDCODE (ARM Ltd.)
- · After a day of tinkering, we gave up :/



- The more hard-core approach
- De-solder the NAND flash from the PCB
- Put it in a universal reader/programmer
- Patch the reader software so that it accepts our cheap TSOP48 adapter from eBay










```
user@bluelagoon:/tmp$ /usr/local/bin/ubireader_display_info ubi.bin
UBI File
       Min I/0: 2048
       LEB Size: 126976
       PEB Size: 131072
       Total Block Count: 1986
       Data Block Count: 1079
       Layout Block Count: 2
       Internal Volume Block Count: 1
       Unknown Block Count: 904
        First UBI PEB Number: 104
        Image: 0
                Image Sequence Num: 0
               Volume Name: Kernel
               Volume Name:Base
               Volume Name:Copyright
               Volume Name: Engine
               Volume Name: InternalStorage
               Volume Name: MBR
               Volume Name: ManBlock
```

Name	^	Size	Modified
≻ in bin		95 items	6/13/19 at 10:27 PM
boo	ot	0 items	6/13/19 at 10:28 PM
- dev		0 items	5/27/18 at 3:27 AM
> etc		147 items	6/13/19 at 10:28 PM
> hor	ne	5 items	6/13/19 at 10:16 PM
> iib		79 items	6/13/19 at 10:28 PM
mei	dia	0 items	5/27/18 at 3:27 AM
mn mn	t	0 items	5/27/18 at 3:27 AM
> opt		3 items	6/13/19 at 10:28 PM
> pkg	-netapps	2 items	6/13/19 at 10:27 PM
pro	c	0 items	5/27/18 at 3:27 AM
- run		0 items	5/27/18 at 3:27 AM
> sbir	n	94 items	6/13/19 at 10:28 PM
- srv		0 items	5/27/18 at 3:27 AM
sys		0 items	5/27/18 at 3:27 AM
= tmp	)	0 items	5/27/18 at 3:27 AM
> usr		9 items	8/10/18 at 8:10 AM
> ar		15 items	12/5/18 at 5:21 PM
■ Bui	ld.Info	941 B	6/13/19 at 10:27 PM
b web		0 B	4/12/19 at 9:41 PM





- Soldered back the NAND
- Works







# Initial access



- Device has secure boot
- Can't just modify the NAND flash
- Need an exploit to get low level access
- Q Can use published P20

vulnerability1

<sup>1</sup>https://www.nccgroup.com/us/research-blog/analyzing-a-pjl-directory-traversal-vulnerability-exploiting-the-lexmark-mc3224i-printer-part-2/









#### Initial access

```
user@bluelagoon:~$ ssh -i id_rsa root@10.12.0.20
Last login: Wed Dec 18 17:16:46 2024 from 10.12.0.2
root@ET788C77107F14:~# id
uid=0(root) gid=0(root) groups=0(root)
root@ET788C77107F14:~#
```

- Can upload and run GDB
- Can now debug vulns
- Of course: update fw and lose shell





# Attack surface



Protocols	CGI scripts	File formats	PDF filters	Font types
HTTP(S)	allfaxerrlogs	image/jpeg	EexecDecode	Type1
LPD	allfaxlogs	image/gif	ASCII85Decode	TrueType
IPP	auto-fwdebug-se	image/png	ASCIIHexDecode	MMType1
Fax	basic_auth.cgi	image/bmp	CCITTFaxDecode	Type3
AppSocket/9100	ccs_logs.cgi	image/x-portable-bitmap	DCTDecode	Type0
	ccs_logs_datagen	image/x-portable-graymap	LZWDecode	CIDFontType0
	ccs_reset.cgi	image/x-portable-pixmap	RunLengthDecode	CIDFontType0C
	ccs_se.cgi	image/x-portable-anymap	NullDecode	CIDFontType2
	ceres_se	image/tiff	PDFDecrypt	CIDFontType2C
	cndlog	image/pcx	FlateDecode	
	collect-selogs-cgi	image/dcx	ReusableStreamDecode	
	datacapture	application/pdf	GIFDecode	
	dcsdebug	application/postscript	PNGDecode	
	del_input_cap		BMPDecode	
	directed_discovery.sh		Base64Decode	
	download_input_cap		SwapBitOrder	
	enginedebugdata		PCXDecode	
	epbbdebug		SubFileDecode	
	eventlogdebug_se		ImageRGBDecode	
	eventlog_se		ImageGrayDecode	
	exportfile		JPXDecode	
			JBIG2Decode	



JBIG2Decode



#### **CGI scripts** File formats **PDF** filters **Protocols** Font types HTTP(S) allfaxerrlogs image/jpeg EexecDecode Type1 ZDI-24-405 LPD allfaxlogs image/gif ASCII85Decode TrueType IPP auto-fwdebug-se image/png ASCIIHexDecode MMType1 Fax basic\_auth.cgi image/bmp CCITTFaxDecode Type3 image/x-portable-bitmap AppSocket/9100 ccs\_logs.cgi DCTDecode OeqvT ZDI-22-333 image/x-portable-graymap LZWDecode CIDFontType0 ccs\_logs\_datagen ccs\_reset.cgi image/x-portable-pixmap RunLengthDecode CIDFontTvpe0C image/x-portable-anymap NullDecode CIDFontType2 ccs\_se.cgi ceres\_se image/tiff **PDFDecrypt** CIDFontType2C cndlog image/pcx FlateDecode collect-selogs-cgi image/dcx ReusableStreamDecode ZDI-22-330 datacapture application/pdf **GIFDecode** dcsdebug application/postscript **PNGDecode** ZDI-22-331 **BMPDecode** ZDI-22-332 del\_input\_cap ZDI-23-668 directed\_discovery.sh Base64Decode ZDI-23-669 download\_input\_cap SwapBitOrder 7DI-22-328 ZDI-24-084 enginedebugdata **PCXDecode** ZDI-22-382 epbbdebug SubFileDecode ZDI-23-663 eventlogdebug\_se ImageRGBDecode 7DI-23-664 ZDI-24-082 eventlog\_se ImageGrayDecode 7DI-23-666 exportfile JPXDecode -7DI-24-081

ZDI-24-083

#### Timeline

- 2022
  - We dumped nand, developed a decryptor
  - Developed a file format exploit (jp2k)
  - First stage (router) exploit failed on stage:(
- 2023

  - Developed another jp2k exploit
    A new update drops hours before the signup deadline
    - It contains entirely new crypto
    - ... and rollback prevention



# Saved by @bl4sty

@rdjgr

@bl4sty

sharen sharen award you in and pay for (

Drinks are sponsored by Trend Micro (p20)

Sure! Let me know I can do for you

What's in it for me?

Sounds good!



## Timeline (cont'd)

- 2023
  - Developed another jp2k exploit
  - A new update drops hours before the signup deadline
    - It contains entirely new crypto
    - ... and rollback prevention
  - 🖯 🛮 Exploit is successful 🥳
- 2024
  - We and <u>abl4sty</u> merge into PHP Hooligans
  - o **abl4sty gets mad, breaks WTM and releases new decryptor**<sup>1</sup>
  - We drop 2 more exploits 65



# JBIG2 image compression

- Reachable over both pdf and fax
- Roll-your-own decoding library
- Plan: exploit pdf, get p2o ca\$h, port to fax





# JBIG2 image compression

SUCCESS - Our final attempt of Pwn2Own Ireland is confirmed! PHP Hooligans / Midnight Blue (@midnightbluelab) used an integer overflow to exploit the Lexmark printer and play us a tune. They earn \$10,000 and 2 Master of Pwn points.

#### Still under embargo





# JBIG2 Heap feng-shui

Without building an entire CPU

- JBIG2 is actually great for heap shaping
  - Elastic size elements
  - Alloc / Free at will
- Sprayed data can be G4 compressed
- Extensions are your friend
  - o Clean, controlled allocation
  - Easy to implement
- Every segment has function pointers

```
struct jbig2_extension_details_t __packed
{
   int32_t type;
   char* data;
   int32_t size;
};
```

```
struct segment __packed
{
    uint32_t segment_number;
    enum SEGMENT_TYPE type;
// ... < snip > ...
    void* func_read_header;
    void* func_dump;
    void* func_decode;
    void* func_free;
    void* data;
};
```





# JBIG2 Heap feng-shui

```
def main():
    exp = Exploit()
    exp.add_comment(1337, b"Hello 38C3!")
    data = exp.dump()
```

```
1337 page=0 offset=000e size=17 EXTENSION
0, 0 ref_segments:
Hello 38C3!
```

```
      pwndbg>
      hexdump
      0x221a0

      +0000
      0x0221a0
      ...


      +0010
      0x0221b0
      ...


      He
      llo.
      38C3
```















# **Exploit time**

2		PRIZE \$	POINTS	8
PWN	Viettel Cyber Security	\$205,000	33	RBOAR
능	Z Team Cluck	\$63,000	17.25	
품	PHP Hooligans / Midnight Blue	\$95,000	16.5	LEAD
MASTER OF	DEVCORE	\$103,750	15.5	
	Neodyme	\$41,875	10.75	
-1				Ų





# Intermezzo: analog phones

- Who here has an analog phone line?
- Good for you. We don't
- How do we even test this?
- Came across this puppy





# Intermezzo: analog phones



Analog phone jacks

- Phone via cable ISP
- Otherwise unusable
- Unless...





#### Cable ISP modem

```
ALTON DESIGNATION
usb 2-2: new high-speed USB device number 49 using xhci_hcd
usb 2-2: New USB device found, idVendor=8564, idProduct=4000
usb 2-2: New USB device strings: Mfr=3, Product=4, SerialNumber=5
usb 2-2: Product: Transcend
usb 2-2: Manufacturer: TS-RDF5
usb 2-2: SerialNumber: 000000000037
usb-storage 2-2:1.0: USB Mass Storage device detected
scsi host3: usb-storage 2-2:1.0
scsi 3:0:0:0: Direct-Access
                               TS-RDF5 SD Transcend TS3A PQ: 0 ANSI: 6
sd 3:0:0:0: Attached scsi generic sg2 type 0
sd 3:0:0:0: [sdc] 230144 512-byte logical blocks: (118 MB/112 MiB)
sd 3:0:0:0: [sdc] Write Protect is off
sd 3:0:0:0: [sdc] Mode Sense: 23 00 00 00
sd 3:0:0:0: [sdc] Write cache: disabled, read cache: enabled, doesn't support DPO or FUA
 sdc: sdc1 sdc2 sdc3 sdc4 < sdc5 sdc6 sdc7 sdc8 sdc9 sdc10 sdc11 sdc12 sdc13 sdc14 sdc15 >
sd 3:0:0:0: [sdc] Attached SCSI removable disk
```

https://blog.danman.eu/about-adding-a-static-route-to-my-docsis-modem/






102



# The setup




https://www.flaticon.com/free-icon/{file}

file = {ethernet\_3826471, spring\_14526364, lead\_16373305, laptop\_595528, paper\_10216243, modem\_236787}



101

# Today we sent a fax



Fax sent with the setup





### Fax

ITU standard	Released date	Data rates (bit/s)	Modulation method
V.27	1988	4800, 2400	PSK
V.29	1988	9600, 7200, 4800	QAM
V.17	1991	14400, 12000, 9600, 7200	TCM
V.34	1994	28800	QAM
V.34bis	1998	33600	QAM
ISDN	1986	64000	4B3T / 2B1Q (line coding)


https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fax





# ... so just fax the exploit?

- Fax speeds are not great for heap shaping
- Pwn20wn exploit is 3.5 MB
  - o \_just\_ 1.7h @ 4800bps 😅
  - Rewrite the exploit from scratch
- Lexmark's JBIG2 is non-standard
  - Nobody else supports this format








## So I wrote a fax client



- I patched efax1
  - o raw data support
  - Send NSF to enable JBIG2
  - No Error Correction Mode, yolo
- High stakes faxing
  - Faxes are saved on disk
  - any parser error crashes the printer
  - The printer reboots on crash
    - $\Rightarrow$  Instantly bootlooped



¹https://www.cce.com/efax/





#### Who uses fax?

- Healthcare
  - Patient records, prescriptions, other sensitive medical documents.
  - 89% of medical offices, 70% of healthcare organizations rely on fax.
- Real Estate
  - Send and receive purchase agreements, lease agreements, other.
  - "Faxes help facilitate the sale of properties and ensure that all parties involved in a transaction are on the same page."
- Government and Legal
  - Widely used within government agencies, courts, and legal practices.
  - 63% of legal departments use faxes to transmit sensitive documents (2019).
  - Some government agencies and courts may require faxes.
- Finance and Banking
  - Sometimes required for signing documents.









#### Pros


- Large attack surface
- No firewalls or NIDS
- High-profile targets
- Wiretap phone line
- Extremely easy to monetize
- Peek printed documents
- Pivot into internal network
  - ARP spoof, PtH, fax on AD domain
- Often overlooked

#### Cons

- Fragmented landscape
- Need device fingerprint
- Not scalable







# Thanks

Any questions?

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