ECCHacks:

a gentle introduction

to elliptic-curve cryptography

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ecchacks.cr.yp.to

<u>Cryptography</u>

Public-key signatures:
e.g., RSA, DSA, ECDSA.
Some uses: signed OS updates,
SSL certificates, e-passports.
Public-key encryption:
e.g., RSA, DH, ECDH.
Some uses: SSL key exchange,
locked iPhone mail download.

Secret-key encryption: e.g., AES, Salsa20. Some uses: disk encryption, bulk SSL encryption.

Why ECC?

"'Index calculus": fastest method we know to break original DH and RSA.

Long history,

including many major improvements:

1975, CFRAC;

- 1977, linear sieve (LS);
- 1982, quadratic sieve (QS);
- 1990, number-field sieve (NFS);
- 1994, function-field sieve (FFS);
- 2006, medium-prime FFS/NFS;
- 2013, $x^q x$ FFS "cryptopocalypse".

(FFS is not relevant to RSA.)

Also many smaller improvements: pprox 100 scientific papers.

Approximate costs of these algorithms for breaking RSA-1024, RSA-2048: CFRAC: 2^{120} , 2^{170} . LS: 2^{110} , 2^{160} . QS: 2^{100} , 2^{150} . NFS: 2^{80} , 2^{112} . Also many smaller improvements: pprox 100 scientific papers.


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1985 Miller

"Use of elliptic curves in cryptography": "It is extremely unlikely that an index calculus' attack on the elliptic curve method will ever be able to work."

The clock



This is the curve $x^2 + y^2 = 1$.

Warning:

This is not an elliptic curve.

"Elliptic curve" \neq "ellipse."

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-

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
$$(1/2, -\sqrt{3/4}) = "5:00".$$

$$(-1/2, -\sqrt{3/4}) = "7:00"$$


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(3/5, 4/5). (-3/5, 4/5).


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
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


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 $x^2 + y^2 = 1$, parametrized by $x = \sin \alpha$, $y = \cos \alpha$. Recall $(\sin(\alpha_1 + \alpha_2), \cos(\alpha_1 + \alpha_2)) =$ $(\sin \alpha_1 \cos \alpha_2 + \cos \alpha_1 \sin \alpha_2,$ $\cos \alpha_1 \cos \alpha_2 - \sin \alpha_1 \sin \alpha_2).$

Clock addition without sin, cos:



Use Cartesian coordinates for addition. Addition formula for the clock $x^2 + y^2 = 1$: sum of (x_1, y_1) and (x_2, y_2) is $(x_1y_2 + y_1x_2, y_1y_2 - x_1x_2)$.

Examples of clock addition: "2:00" + "5:00" $=(\sqrt{3/4}, 1/2) + (1/2, -\sqrt{3/4})$ $=(-1/2,-\sqrt{3/4})=$ "7:00". "5:00" + "9:00" $=(1/2,-\sqrt{3/4})+(-1,0)$ $=(\sqrt{3/4}, 1/2) = 200$ $2\left(\frac{3}{5},\frac{4}{5}\right) = \left(\frac{24}{25},\frac{7}{25}\right).$

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Examples of clock addition:
"2:00" + "5:00"
=
$$(\sqrt{3/4}, 1/2) + (1/2, -\sqrt{3/4})$$

= $(-1/2, -\sqrt{3/4}) =$ "7:00".
"5:00" + "9:00"
= $(1/2, -\sqrt{3/4}) + (-1, 0)$
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
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Clocks over finite fields



.

Clock(\mathbf{F}_7) = {(x, y) \in $\mathbf{F}_7 \times \mathbf{F}_7 : x^2 + y^2 = 1$ }. Here \mathbf{F}_7 = {0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6} = {0, 1, 2, 3, -3, -2, -1}

with arithmetic modulo 7.

e.g. $2 \cdot 5 = 3$ and 3/2 = 5 in **F**₇.

>>> for x in range(7):
<pre> for y in range(7):</pre>
if (x*x+y*y) % 7 == 1:
print (x,y)
• • •
(0, 1)
(0, 6)
(1, 0)
(2, 2)
(2, 5)
(5, 2)
(5, 5)
(6, 0)
>>>

>>> class F7:

def __init__(self,x): self.int = x % 7• • • def __str__(self): • • • return str(self.int) • • • ... __repr__ = __str__ • • • >>> print F7(2) 2 >>> print F7(6) 6 >>> print F7(7) 0 >>> print F7(10) 3

>>> F7.__eq__ = \ ... lambda a,b: a.int == b.int >>> >>> print F7(7) == F7(0)True >>> print F7(10) == F7(3) True >>> print F7(-3) == F7(4)True >>> print F7(0) == F7(1)False >>> print F7(0) == F7(2)False >>> print F7(0) == F7(3) False

>>> F7.__add___ = \ lambda a,b: F7(a.int + b.int) >>> F7.__sub__ = \ lambda a,b: F7(a.int - b.int) >>> F7.__mul__ = \ lambda a,b: F7(a.int * b.int) • • • >>> >>> print F7(2) + F7(5) 0 >>> print F7(2) - F7(5) 4 >>> print F7(2) * F7(5) 3 >>>

Larger example: $Clock(F_{1000003})$.

p = 100003

class Fp:

• • •

```
def clockadd(P1,P2):
    x1,y1 = P1
    x2,y2 = P2
    x3 = x1*y2+y1*x2
    y3 = y1*y2-x1*x2
    return x3,y3
```

```
>>> P = (Fp(1000), Fp(2))
>>> P2 = clockadd(P,P)
>>> print P2
(4000, 7)
>>> P3 = clockadd(P2,P)
>>> print P3
(15000, 26)
>>> P4 = clockadd(P3,P)
>>> P5 = clockadd(P4,P)
>>> P6 = clockadd(P5,P)
>>> print P6
(780000, 1351)
>>> print clockadd(P3,P3)
(780000, 1351)
>>>
```

>>> def scalarmult(n,P):

- ... if n == 0: return (Fp(0), Fp(1))
- \ldots if n == 1: return P
- ... Q = scalarmult(n//2,P)
- ... Q = clockadd(Q,Q)
- ... if n % 2: Q = clockadd(P,Q)
- ... return Q
- >>> n = oursixdigitsecret
 >>> scalarmult(n,P)
 (947472, 736284)

>>>

Can you figure out our secret n?

Clock cryptography


The "Clock Diffie-Hellman protocol":


Standardize a large prime pand **base point** $(x, y) \in Clock(\mathbf{F}_p)$.

Alice chooses big secret a. Alice computes her public key a(x, y).

Bob chooses big secret b. Bob computes his public key b(x, y).

Alice computes a(b(x, y)). Bob computes b(a(x, y)). They use this shared secret to encrypt with AES-GCM etc.





Warning #1: Many choices of p are unsafe!

Warning #2: Clocks aren't elliptic! Can use index calculus to attack clock cryptography. To match RSA-3072 security need $p \approx 2^{1536}$. Warning #3: Attacker sees more than the public keys a(x, y) and b(x, y).

Attacker sees how much time Alice uses to compute a(b(x, y)). Often attacker can see time for *each operation* performed by Alice, not just total time. This reveals secret scalar a.


Some timing attacks: 2011 Brumley–Tuveri; 2013 "Lucky Thirteen" (not ECC); 2014 Benger–van de Pol–Smart–Yarom; etc. Warning #3: Attacker sees more than the public keys a(x, y) and b(x, y).

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
Fix: **constant-time** code, performing same operations no matter what scalar is.

Addition on an elliptic curve



 $x^2 + y^2 = 1 - 30x^2y^2.$ Sum of (x_1, y_1) and (x_2, y_2) is $((x_1y_2+y_1x_2)/(1-30x_1x_2y_1y_2),$ $(y_1y_2-x_1x_2)/(1+30x_1x_2y_1y_2)).$

The clock again, for comparison:



$$egin{aligned} x^2+y^2 &= 1. \ & ext{Sum of } (x_1,y_1) ext{ and } (x_2,y_2) ext{ is } \ & ext{(} x_1y_2+y_1x_2, \ & ext{ } y_1y_2-x_1x_2 ext{)}. \end{aligned}$$

More elliptic curves

Choose an odd prime p. Choose a *non-square* $d \in \mathbf{F}_p$.

$$egin{aligned} &\{(x,y)\in \mathsf{F}_p imes \mathsf{F}_p:\ &x^2+y^2=1+dx^2y^2 \} \end{aligned}$$

is a "complete Edwards curve".

def edwardsadd(P1,P2):

"Hey, there are divisions in the Edwards addition law! What if the denominators are 0?" "Hey, there are divisions in the Edwards addition law! What if the denominators are 0?" Answer: Can prove that the denominators are never 0.

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If we instead choose square *d*: curve is still elliptic, and addition *seems to work*, but there are failure cases, often exploitable by attackers. Safe code is more complicated. "Hey, divisions are really slow!"

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Instead of dividing a by b, store fraction a/b as pair (a, b). Remember arithmetic on fractions? "Hey, divisions are really slow!"

Instead of dividing a by b, store fraction a/b as pair (a, b). Remember arithmetic on fractions?

One option: "projective coordinates". Store (X, Y, Z) representing (X/Z, Y/Z).

Another option: "extended coordinates". Store projective (X, Y, Z) and T = XY/Z.

See "Explicit Formulas Database" for many more options and speedups: hyperelliptic.org/EFD

Elliptic-curve cryptography

Standardize prime p, safe non-square d, base point (x, y) on elliptic curve.

Alice knows her secret key aand Bob's public key b(x, y). Alice computes (and caches) shared secret ab(x, y).

Alice uses shared secret to encrypt and authenticate packet for Bob.

Packet overhead at high security level:

- 32 bytes for Alice's public key,
- 24 bytes for nonce,
- 16 bytes for authenticator.

Bob receives packet, sees Alice's public key a(x, y). Bob computes (and caches) shared secret ab(x, y).

Bob uses shared secret to verify authenticator and decrypt packet.

Alice and Bob reuse the same shared secret to encrypt, authenticate, verify, and decrypt all subsequent packets.

All of this is so fast that we can afford to encrypt all packets.

A safe example

Choose $p = 2^{255} - 19$. Choose d = 121665/121666; this is non-square in **F**_p.

 $x^2 + y^2 = 1 + dx^2 y^2$

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Actually, the second curve is the first curve in disguise: replace x in first curve by $\sqrt{-1} \cdot x$, using $\sqrt{-1} \in \mathbf{F}_p$.

Even more elliptic curves

Edwards curves: $x^2 + y^2 = 1 + dx^2y^2$.

Twisted Edwards curves: $ax^2 + y^2 = 1 + dx^2y^2$.

Weierstrass curves: $y^2 = x^3 + a_4x + a_6$.

Montgomery curves: $By^2 = x^3 + Ax^2 + x$.

Many relationships: e.g., obtain Edwards (x, y)given Montgomery (x', y') by computing x = x'/y', y = (x' - 1)/(x' + 1). Addition on Weierstrass curves $y^2 = x^3 + a_4x + a_6$:

Addition on Weierstrass curves

$$y^2 = x^3 + a_4x + a_6$$
:
for $x_1 \neq x_2$, $(x_1, y_1) + (x_2, y_2) =$
 (x_3, y_3) with $x_3 = \lambda^2 - x_1 - x_2$,
 $y_3 = \lambda(x_1 - x_3) - y_1$,
 $\lambda = (y_2 - y_1)/(x_2 - x_1)$;
for $y_1 \neq 0$, $(x_1, y_1) + (x_1, y_1) =$
 (x_3, y_3) with $x_3 = \lambda^2 - x_1 - x_2$,
 $y_3 = \lambda(x_1 - x_3) - y_1$,
 $\lambda = (3x_1^2 + a_4)/2y_1$;
 $(x_1, y_1) + (x_1, -y_1) = \infty$;
 $(x_1, y_1) + (x_1, -y_1) = \infty$;
 $(x_1, y_1) + (x_2, y_2) = (x_2, y_2)$;
 $\infty + \infty = \infty$.

Addition on Weierstrass curves

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 $y_3 = \lambda(x_1 - x_3) - y_1$,
 $\lambda = (3x_1^2 + a_4)/2y_1$;
 $(x_1, y_1) + (x_1, -y_1) = \infty$;
 $(x_1, y_1) + (x_1, -y_1) = \infty$;
 $(x_1, y_1) + \infty = (x_1, y_1)$;
 $\infty + (x_2, y_2) = (x_2, y_2)$;
 $\infty + \infty = \infty$.

Messy to implement and test.

Much nicer than Weierstrass: Montgomery curves with the "Montgomery ladder".

Curve selection

How to defend yourself against

an attacker armed with a mathematician:

1999 ANSI X9.62.

2000 IEEE P1363.

- 2000 Certicom SEC 2.
- 2000 NIST FIPS 186-2.
- 2001 ANSI X9.63.
- 2005 Brainpool.
- 2005 NSA Suite B.
- 2010 Certicom SEC 2 v2.
- 2010 OSCCA SM2.
- 2011 ANSSI FRP256V1.

You can pick any of these standards.

What your chosen standard achieves: No known attack will compute ECC user's secret key from public key. ("Elliptic-curve discrete-log problem.")

Example of criterion in all standards: Standard base point (x, y)has huge prime "order" ℓ , i.e., exactly ℓ different multiples.

All criteria are computer-verifiable. See our evaluation site for scripts: safecurves.cr.yp.to You do everything right.

You pick the Brainpool curve brainpoolP256t1: huge prime p, $y^2 = x^3 - 3x$ + somehugenumber, standard base point.

This curve isn't compatible with Edwards or Montgomery. So you check and test every case in the Weierstrass formulas.

You make it all constant-time. It's horrendously slow, but it's secure.

Actually, it's not. You're screwed.

The attacker sent you (x', y') with

 $x' = {1025b35abab9150d86770f6bda12f8ec \ 1e86bec6c6bac120535e4134fea87831}$ and $y' = {12ace5eeae9a5b0bca8ed1c0f9540d05 \ d123d55f68100099b65a99ac358e3a75}.$

You computed "shared secret" a(x', y')using the Weierstrass formulas. You encrypted data using AES-GCM with a hash of a(x', y') as a key.

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What you never noticed: (x', y') isn't his public key b(x, y); it isn't even a point on brainpoolP256t1; it's a point on $y^2 = x^3 - 3x + 5$ of order only 4999. Your formulas worked for $y^2 = x^3 - 3x + 5$ because they work for any $y^2 = x^3 - 3x + a_6$:

Addition on Weierstrass curves

$$y^2 = x^3 + a_4x + a_6$$
:
for $x_1 \neq x_2$, $(x_1, y_1) + (x_2, y_2) =$
 (x_3, y_3) with $x_3 = \lambda^2 - x_1 - x_2$,
 $y_3 = \lambda(x_1 - x_3) - y_1$,
 $\lambda = (y_2 - y_1)/(x_2 - x_1)$;
for $y_1 \neq 0$, $(x_1, y_1) + (x_1, y_1) =$
 (x_3, y_3) with $x_3 = \lambda^2 - x_1 - x_2$,
 $y_3 = \lambda(x_1 - x_3) - y_1$,
 $\lambda = (3x_1^2 + a_4)/2y_1$;
 $(x_1, y_1) + (x_1, -y_1) = \infty$;
 $(x_1, y_1) + (x_1, -y_1) = \infty$;
 $(x_1, y_1) + \infty = (x_1, y_1)$;
 $\infty + (x_2, y_2) = (x_2, y_2)$;
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nere!

Why this matters: (x', y') has order 4999. a(x', y') is determined by $a \mod 4999$. The attacker tries all 4999 possibilities, compares to the AES-GCM output, learns your secret $a \mod 4999$. Why this matters: (x', y') has order 4999. a(x', y') is determined by $a \mod 4999$. The attacker tries all 4999 possibilities, compares to the AES-GCM output, learns your secret $a \mod 4999$.

Attacker then tries again with

 $x'={pbc001a0d2d5c43863aadb0f881df3bb\over af3a5ea81eedd2385e6525521aa8b1e2}$ and $y'={0d124e9e94dcede52aa0e3bcac1852cf\over ed28eb86039c0d8e0cfaa4ae703eac07},$

a point of order 19559 on $y^2 = x^3 - 3x + 211$;

learns your secret a mod 19559.

Etc. Uses "Chinese remainder theorem" to combine this information.

Traditional response to this security failure: Blame the implementor.

"You should have checked that the incoming (x', y') was on the right curve and had the right order."

(And maybe paid patent fees to Certicom.)

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But it's much better to

design the system without traps.

Never send uncompressed (x, y).

Design protocols to compress one coordinate down to 1 bit, or 0 bits! Drastically limits possibilities for attacker to choose points.

Always multiply DH scalar by cofactor.

If the curve has $c \cdot \ell$ points and the base point P has order ℓ then c is called the cofactor and $c \cdot \ell$ is called the curve order.

Design DH protocols to multiply by c.

Always choose twist-secure curves.

Montgomery formulas use only *A*, but modifying *B* gives only *two* different curve orders. Require both of these orders to be large primes times small cofactors.

DH protocols with all of these protections are robust against every common DH implementation error.

ECC standards: the next generation

Fix the standard curves and protocols so that **simple** implementations are **secure** implementations.

Bonus: next-generation curves such as Curve25519 are faster than the standards!

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2013.05 Bernstein–Krasnova–Lange specify a procedure to generate a next-generation curve at any security level. 2013.09 Patrick Pelletier: "Given the doubt that's recently been cast on the NIST curves, is it time to revive the idea of adding curve25519 as a named curve?" 2013.09 Patrick Pelletier: "Given the doubt that's recently been cast on the NIST curves, is it time to revive the idea of adding curve25519 as a named curve?"

2013.09 Douglas Stebila: Reasons to support Curve25519 are "efficiency and resistance to side-channel attacks" rather than concerns about backdoors.

2013.09 Nick Mathewson: "In the FOSS cryptography world nowadays, I see many more new users of curve25519 than of the NIST curves, because of efficiency and ease-of-implementation issues."

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2013.10 Aranha–Barreto–Pereira–Ricardini announce next-generation curves computed at various security levels.

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[...more than 1000 email messages ...]

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2014.12 CFRG discussion is continuing.

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Sage scripts to verify criteria for ECDLP security and ECC security: safecurves.cr.yp.to

Analysis of manipulability of various curve-generation methods:

safecurves.cr.yp.to/bada55.html

Many computer-verified addition formulas: hyperelliptic.org/EFD/

Python scripts for this talk: ecchacks.cr.yp.to