

The Future of Protocol Reversing and Simulation Applied on ZeroAccess

29C3, Hamburg

December 29 2012

@Netzob

Authors...

« You talkin' to me? »

Travis Bickle


A black and white photograph showing several pieces of cheese, likely French, arranged in a pile. In the foreground, a wedge of cheese with a soft, creamy texture and a small hole is visible. Behind it, larger blocks of cheese with rinds, some appearing crumbly and others smooth, are stacked. The lighting highlights the textures of the cheese surfaces.

Yes, we're French !



Frédéric GUIHERY (@_sygus)

- ▶ IT security engineer
 - Reverse engineering
 - System analysis and hardening
 - Trusted Computing





Georges BOSSERT (@Lapeluche)


- ▶ PhD student
 - Intrusion Detection
 - Botnet simulation
 - Protocol learning


Supelec CIDre
Research team



Advisers :


- *Guillaume Hiet*
- *Ludovic Mé*





AMOSSYS, France


- ▶ Audit and evaluation
 - ITSEF lab (Common Criteria, CSPNs, ...)
 - Pentest lab
- ▶ R&D



Topics...


« Go ahead, make my day »


Harry Callahan




Reverse protocols
Simulate endpoints
Map botnets


Why reverse engineering of protocols ?





Protocols are everywhere





Protocols are everywhere
(even within Tamagotchis)


Assess the robustness of implementations

- Ex : Fuzz the control API of a centrifuge
- 29C3 Ex :
 - « Many Tamagotchis Were Harmed in the Making of this Presentation »
 - « EXSi Beast »




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
Analyze traffic and identify potential data leakage

- ▶ Ex : Are you sure your « IP Reputation Appliance » doesn't leak your emails ?




Compare the implementation of a protocol
with its official specifications

- ▶ Ex : CC evaluations of crypto products




To develop a free version of a proprietary implementation

- Ex : Drew Fisher's talk @ 28C3 on Kinect RE



Current reverse engineering approach...




Have you ever (tried to) RE a protocol ?





Did it looked like this ?

```
4f945a3c0427c99812598f1779e0bb1c2722165b3497f4c607deb34efb5ef1878aea36bce6ae7d9be  
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888a9c9f56f879976a0bd34c00a00f5ffcafc05ef8f1118fe604c0800f7ffcfeacacb8a02621800  
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```



Did it looked like this ?




Did it looked like this ?

- Complex B64(Y)

MOSTLY VISUAL


► Time-consuming

Mostly Manual






No available tool to **reverse**
a proprietary protocol...



Should we create one?

Let's see if we can **automate**
some RE tasks...



Some reminders about protocols




Let's examine the TCP protocol





Different **types** of messages

- ▶ SYN message
- ▶ ACK message
- ▶ PUSH message
- ▶ FIN message
- ▶ RST message
- ▶ ...




Concept of encapsulation layers




Fields partitioning


Source Port	Destination Port					
Sequence Number						
Acknowledgement Number						
Data offset	Reserved	Flags	Window			
Checksum		Urgent				
Options and Padding						
Data						




Relations




Intra-message relations



Relations




Inter-message relations




Contextual values

Source Port	Destination Port					
Sequence Number						
Acknowledgement Number						
Data offset	Reserved	Flags	Window			
Checksum		Urgent				
Options and Padding						
Data						





Application-level values

Source Port	Destination Port					
Sequence Number						
Acknowledgement Number						
Data offset	Reserved	Flags	Window			
Checksum		Urgent				
Options and Padding						
Data						



Sequence of valid messages




A black and white photograph of a wind farm. Numerous wind turbines are scattered across a grassy hillside under a dramatic, cloudy sky. The perspective is from a low angle, looking up at the turbines.

Let's find a **model** that
covers protocol attributes

Academics are very good with * models :)


* sometimes useless





« *Design and Validation of Computer Protocols* »
by G. Holzmann

A Communication Protocol is made of
5 distinct parts ...




a service (1/5)




a service (1/5)




some **assumptions** about the
environment (2/5)




a vocabulary of messages (3/5)




the encoding (format) of each message
(4/5)



the procedure rules (5/5)




Yes, that was an academic model



Reduced model for a Protocol

- ▶ a vocabulary → a list of **Message Format**
- ▶ a grammar → **State Machine**







Introducing Netzob ...

Goals of Netzob

- Infer unknown (proprietary) protocols

Simulate actors of a communication

Smart-Fuzz targeted implementations





Goals of Netzob

Infer unknown (proprietary) protocols



- ▶ Simulate actors of a communication

Smart-Fuzz targeted implementations




Goals of Netzob



- Infer unknown (proprietary) protocols
- Simulate actors of a communication
- ▶ Smart-fuzz targeted implementations





Approach taken by Netzob

- **Passive** and **active** inference
- Semi-Automatic Approach
- **No binary manipulation**








Netzob implementation


- Graphical interface (GTK3)
- Mostly written in **Python** and C (46 000 LOC)
- Plugin architecture
- Available through
 - **GIT Repositories**
 - Python package
 - Per-Os packages (Debian, Ubuntu, Gento, ...)



Netzob team (chronologically ordered)

- Georges Bossert
- Frédéric Guihéry
- Guillaume Hiet
- Olivier Tétard
- Maxime Olivier
- Alexandre Pigné
- Goulven Guiheux
- Frank Roland
- Fabien André
- Quentin Heyler
- Benjamin Dufour
- Giuseppe massaro

Netzob's Sponsors



« State of the art » boundaries

Fuzzing

Language Theory


Reverse Engineering

Grammar Inference

Botnet Behavioural Analysis

Sum of human knowledge

The unknown



NEW « State of the art » boundaries

Fuzzing
Language Theory

Reverse Engineering


Grammar Inference


Botnet Behavioural Analysis

New sum of human knowledge

The unknown

Based on an original idea of Matt Might



A black and white photograph of a person sitting in a dark server room aisle. The person is facing away from the camera, looking down at a laptop screen. They are wearing a dark hoodie and jeans. The aisle is flanked by tall server racks on both sides, their front panels featuring a grid of ventilation holes. The ceiling above is made of metal beams with integrated lighting fixtures. The overall atmosphere is dim and technical.

RE Zero Access C&C
protocol with Netzob


Zero Access (aka Sirefef)

- ▶ Recent botnet (Sept. 2011)
 - ▶ still in activity
- ▶ +/- 1 million zombies (9 millions installed)
- ▶ **Click fraud and bitcoin miner**
- ▶ At least 2 versions of the rootkit
 - ▶ Upgraded **P2P** protocol

Based on Sophos and KindSight Reports

Zero Access (aka Sirefef)

- ▶ Multiple **P2P management messages**
 - ▶ Peers directory retrieval
 - ▶ Files directory retrieval
- ▶ UDP & TCP connections
 - ▶ UDP for messages (udp:16464)
 - ▶ TCP for data
- ▶ **Hard coded Bootstrap Peers**
 - ▶ Ex : 68.51.108.245, (...), 216.211.181.226



Let's play with its P2P protocol



Requirements




Few **real** communication traces

ZAccess : some traces were provided by

Kevin McNamee


an **infected machine**

Contagio (<http://contagiodump.blogspot.com>)



A **confined** environment and **the binary**


Adapted Virtual Machines + Firewalls + Torify + management system




A **confined** environment and **the binary**

Adapted Virtual Machines + Firewalls + Torify + management system

Warning : Consider legal issues before dealing with this !




Step 1 : Get messages



Capture **dataflows**


(Network, USB, IPC, API Hooking, Raw files, ...)



Capture **dataflows**

(Network, USB, IPC, API Hooking, Raw files, ...)

```
?..b(.....@.p...aU(.....3.Mi.L..."..f3.8:+.6..d...x,'3...>4...L.....:3.8;..q..d...Q..3.....
L.QsY.8:3..m.0...d.E....3.Zj."...L.F...8:3-.>ad...s
.....3%.GgM.... | ..C.8:...}...o.....(t0...iW.....oj.. `?...~.!c.p./e..z.....%gl.T.s.mE..+-..;
R.{eoDz.}At..d.QP3.SX=)::JU.7` ..t...g.V..5.2.....OW..f2p.X8(.....r..7.....S..&8...!..
'.p.....<
..g3...C....&(P..T...y....5..2.....v...&.....iM..e
....].LP....N..X.SV.JA.M.....#.Y{....;XVptd....t..
....=.O..?... Qpga("...;...^:....LU..>'..i..1=...ui.
L8.7c....@.....}1iN.7...25t.G.)53.,.....S.....9.'L5.J.
?..b(.....@.p.gN..(.....3V...L.....f3.8?:e..d.....3....x.F.L...u..:3.8;:Wu..d.| ....3.._...'..L.[Z.
8:3.h..4...d.b....3.....L...k.8:3}.e.d.....3%.GgM.... | ..C.8:...}...o.....(t0...iW.....oj..
`?...~.!c.p./e..z.....%gl.T.s.mE..+-..;R.{eoDz.}At..d.QP3.SX=)::JU.7` ..t...g.V..5.2.....OW..f2p.X8(.....r..7.....S..&8...!..
'.p.....<
..g3...C....&(P..T...y....5..2.....v...&.....iM..e
....].LP....N..X.SV.JA.M.....#.Y{....;XVptd....t..
....=.O..?... Qpga("...;...^:....LU..>'..i..1=...ui.
L8.7c....@.....}1iN.7...25t.G.)53.,.....S.....9.'L5.J.
```



Split dataflows in messages

(sub protocol knowledge, time based, delimiter...)

?..b(.....@.p...aU(.....3.Mi.L..."..f3.8:+.6..d...x,'3...>4...L.....:3.8;..q..d...Q..3.....
L8(.....r..7.....S..&8....!..

Message 1

R.{eoDz.}At..d.QP3.SX=)::JU.7`..t...gV..5.2.....

Message 2

'p.....<.....


..g3...C....&(P..T...y....5..2.....v...&.....iM..e
....].LP....N..X.SV.JA.M.....#Y.{....;XVptd....t..
....=O..?... Qpga("...;...^:....LU..>'..i..1=...ui.
L8.7c....@.....}1iN.7...25t.G.)53,,.....S.....9.'..L5.J.
?..b(.....@.p.gN..(.....3V...L.....f3.8?:e..d.....3....x.F.L...u.:3.8;.Wu..d.|....3.._'.L5.J.
[Z.

Message 3

8:3.....L...k.8:3}.e.d.....3%.GgM....| ..C.8:....}...o.....(t0...iW.....oj..
`?...~.!c.p./e..z.....%gl.T.s.mE..+-..;R.{eoDz.}At..d.QP3.SX=)::JU.7`..t...gV..5.2.....
OW..f2p.X8(.....r..7.....S..&8....!..

'p.....<...g3...C....&(P..T...y....5..2.....v...&.....iM..e
....].LP....N..X.SV.JA.M.....#Y.{....;XVptd....t..
....=O..?... Qpga("...;...^:....LU..>'..i..1=...ui.
L8.7c....@.....}1iN.7...25t.G.)53,,.....S.....9.'..L5.J.

Message 4



capture_p2p_canal_getl_retl.pcap [Wireshark 1.8.2]

File Edit View Go Capture Analyze Statistics Telephony Tools Internals Help

Filter: Expression... Clear Apply Enregistrer

Time	Source	Destination	Protocol	Length	Info
1 0.000000000			UDP	58	Source port: 52483 Destination port: 16464
2 1.000867000			UDP	58	Source port: 52483 Destination port: 16464
3 2.002419000			UDP	58	Source port: 52483 Destination port: 16464
4 3.003707000			UDP	58	Source port: 52483 Destination port: 16464
5 4.004729000			UDP	58	Source port: 52483 Destination port: 16464
6 4.511146000			UDP	610	Source port: 16464 Destination port: 52483
7 5.006712000			UDP	58	Source port: 51576 Destination port: 16464

Frame 1: 58 bytes on wire (464 bits), 58 bytes captured (464 bits) on interface 0

Ethernet II, Src: [REDACTED], Dst: [REDACTED]

Internet Protocol Version 4, Src: [REDACTED]

User Datagram Protocol, Src Port: 52483 (52483), Dst Port: 16464 (16464)

Data (16 bytes)

Data: 0cb14db628948dabc9c0d19909e7c9d5
[Length: 16]

0000 8d ab c9 c0 d1 99 09 e7 c9 d5 0c b1 4d b6 28 94

Frame (frame), 58 bytes

Packets: 202 Displayed: 202 Marked: 0 Load time... Profile: Default

Capturer les messages réseau

Device: eth0

BPF Filter:

Import layer: Raw Layer 2 (Ethernet/Linux SLL) Layer 3 (IPv4) Layer 4 (UDP/TCP)

Count limit: 10 Time limit: 10

Launch capture

Source IP	Destination IP	Protocol	Source Port	Destination Port	Payload
192.168.200.180	10.0.0.1	UDP	57641	53	e82f0100000100000
192.168.200.180	10.0.0.1	UDP	57641	53	48690100000100000
10.0.0.1	192.168.200.180	UDP	53	57641	e82f8180000100000
10.0.0.1	192.168.200.180	UDP	53	57641	48698180000100000
192.168.200.180	204.43.111.196	TCP	57162	80	474554202f20485454

Select all Unselect all Invert selection

Ether: d4:be:d9:6a:55:60 -> 0:21:91:b:84:bc
IP 192.168.200.180 -> 204.43.111.196
TCP ack push 57162 -> 80
TCP Option: No Operation
TCP Option: No Operation
TCP Option: Timestamp

4745 5420 2f20 4854 5450 2f31 2e31 0d0a GET / HTTP/1.1..

Displayed Packets:5 Selected Packets:3


Annuler Import messages

Import


Capture

Netzob framework


Filter imported messages
Choose layer of import



Step 2 : RE vocabulary




Abstract messages



1 message = a sorted **received or sent**
sequence of bits

010110101001000101010110100101011101010001010010




1 message = a sorted **received or sent**
sequence of bits



specific to a context

Emails, IPs, Timestamps, BID, AddID, ...


010110101001000101010110100101011101010001010010




We have to **decontextualize** messages

The IDEA :


Regroup messages by **similarity** and find
contextual variations



We consider similar messages based on their
common partitioning




Messages are splitted in Fields using



Messages are splitted in Fields using

- Simple Alignment
- Delimiter-based Alignment
- Sequence Alignment

3e341eb5ce	4c068e	c2d5baed3a	331938	3b108271e8
dc18fcb8ce	4c068e	2da8f3e33a	331938	cf48cd8fe8
dc18fcb8ce	4c068e	2da8f3e33a	331938	cf48cd8fe8



Messages are splitted in Fields using

- Simple Alignment
- Delimiter-based Alignment
- Sequence Alignment

cfa0	4c	5519e43e2e27fa6916313dc89ac77569a00d	4c	38f
cfa0	4c	5519e43e2e27fa6916313dc89ac77569a00d	4c	38f
cfa0	4c	5519e43e2e27fa6916313dc89ac77569a00d	4c	38f




Messages are splitted in Fields using

- Simple Alignment
- Delimiter-based Alignment
- Sequence Alignment

Needleman & Wunsch

3a8	70	832f65bd867ad2	00	d9aeddc
3a8	70	832f65bd867ad2	00	d9aeddc
	70	c400	00	
	70	c400	00	



But WTF is Needleman & Wunsch ?




Sequence alignment with Needleman-Wunsh
applied to RE of protocols (c.f. Marshall Bedoe)

We start with 2 messages

70 83 2f 65 bd 86 7a d2 00


70 c4 00 00



Sequence alignment with Needleman-Wunsh

		70	83	2f	65	bd	86	7a	d2	00
70										
c4										
00										
00										


We build a distance matrix



Sequence alignment with Needleman-Wunsh

		70	83	2f	65	bd	86	7a	d2	00
	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
70	0									
c4	0									
00	0									
00	0									

We initialize the matrix



Sequence alignment with Needleman-Wunsh


		70	83	2f	65	bd	86	7a	d2	00
	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
70	0	?								
c4	0									
00	0									
00	0									

We fill the matrix with the formula:

$$M(i,j) = \max(M(i-1, j-1) + S, M(i, j-1) + W, M(i-1, j) + W)$$

S: Match/Mismatch score (+/- 10)

W: Gap score (0)




Sequence alignment with Needleman-Wunsh

		70	83	2f	65	bd	86	7a	d2	00
	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
70	0	?								
c4	0									
00	0									
00	0									

We fill the matrix with the formula:


$$M(i,j) = \text{Max}(M(i-1, j-1) + S, M(i, j-1) + W, M(i-1, j) + W)$$



Sequence alignment with Needleman-Wunsh

		70	83	2f	65	bd	86	7a	d2	00
	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
70	0	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10
c4	0	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10
00	0	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	20
00	0	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	20


We fill the matrix



Sequence alignment with Needleman-Wunsh

		70	83	2f	65	bd	86	7a	d2	00
	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
70	0	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10
c4	0	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10
00	0	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	20
00	0	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	20

We do a traceback




Sequence alignment with Needleman-Wunsh

		70	83	2f	65	bd	86	7a	d2	00
	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
70	0	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10
c4	0	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10
00	0	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	20
00	0	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	20

We compute the common pattern

70 83 2f 65 bd 86 7a d2 00

70 c4 00 -- -- -- -- -- 00



Sequence alignment with Needleman-Wunsh

We finally build a regex


70 83 2f 65 bd 86 7a d2 00

70 c4 00 -- -- -- -- -- 00

(70)

(.*{2,7})


(00)



Static Fields

3a8	70	832f65bd867ad2	00	d9aeddd
3a8	70	832f65bd867ad2	00	d9aeddd
	70	c400	00	
	70	c400	00	


Symbol x → [..., 0x70, (.*){4,14}, 0x00, ...]



Static Fields				
3a8	70	832f65bd867ad2	00	d9aeddd
3a8	70	832f65bd867ad2	00	d9aeddd
	70	c400	00	
	70	c400	00	

Dynamic Fields

Symbol x → [..., 0x70, (.*){4,14}, 0x00, ...]




How to measure **similarity** between two messages ?

Measure the Quality of Fields

$0 \% < \text{Similarity Score} < 100 \%$


Messages have
Nothing in common

Messages are
identicals



Similarity scores between messages


- ▶ S1: ratio of **dynamic fields / bytes**
- ▶ S2: ratio of **common dynamic bytes**



Similarity scores between messages

- ▶ S1: ratio of **dynamic fields / bytes**
- ▶ S2: ratio of **common dynamic bytes**

The design of Netzob allows for inclusion of future factors




Similarity scores between messages


- ▶ S1: ratio of **dynamic fields / bytes**
- ▶ S2: ratio of common dynamic bytes

70 83 2f 65 bd 86 7a d2 00

70 c4 00 -- -- -- -- -- 00



$$S1 = 1 / (1 + 2)$$




Similarity scores between messages

- ▶ S1: ratio of dynamic fields / bytes
- ▶ S2: ratio of common dynamic bytes

70 83 2f 65 bd 86 7a d2 00



70 c4 00 -- -- -- -- -- 00

$$S2 = 2 / 7$$




Similarity scores between messages

- ▶ S1: ratio of **dynamic fields / bytes**
- ▶ S2: ratio of **common dynamic bytes**




How to retrieve **groups** of similar messages ?




Hierarchical Clustering by similarities:

Similarity matrix


UPGMA




- ▶ Filling of a similarity matrix
- ▶ Iteratively merge the 2 most similar messages





UPGMA creates a similarity tree



```
31654f21ebd6d3fa069b1969a2086c8f49af0b32151ab68d7  
d984712f5423fd73b2f9c1150534960778387bef46a49d96b  
83ff7be428948dbec9c0d1998381a333ee109a994c068ece  
2b65e6d528948dbec9c0d1998381a3337f28829a4c068ece  
3f4196db28948dbec9c0d1998381a3336a592b9a4c068ece  
811255ac28948dbec9c0d1998381a333d9fc8984c068ece  
17141d0a574034475c4254131e4f171c2d371c541c071f4f4  
44134a4745131013114a414b4b144017727d7272721a060  
00000080945cc83c00300000  
cb0000808d7fe63c00480000  
Symbol 14 3fd7986228948dabc9c0d19940b670c40000  
Symbol 13 3fd7986228948dabc9c0d19940b670c40000  
3fd7986228948dabc9c0d19940b670c40000  
3fd7986228948dabc9c0d19940b670c40000  
3fd7986228948dabc9c0d19940b670c40000
```




UPGMA creates a similarity tree and facilitates clustering




ZAccess Example

Results of Clustering and Sequence Alignment


Symboles			Symbol 5						
Nom	Message	Champ	Field 0	Field 1	Field 2	Field 3	Field 4	Field 5	Field 6
			(.{8})	(4c74657200000000)	(.{2})	(000000)	(.{8})	(00000000)	
Symbol 10	5	3	01a76c9f	4c74657200000000	03	000000	bd584ae8	00000000	d21
Symbol 25	8	3	9782e4fb	4c74657200000000	06	000000	c725c5ca	00000000	b71
Symbol 23	10	5	46b9c0a9	4c74657200000000	05	000000	d0b4d6d1	00000000	be1
Symbol 5	8	12	b7dafb61	4c74657200000000	0e	000000	deed851e	00000000	aa1
			db34786e	4c74657200000000	0c	000000	e029f3c8	00000000	bd1
			738a2cf6	4c74657200000000	07	000000	b6d28e36	00000000	8fa
			badfa0e7	4c74657200000000	05	000000	b85b8fda	00000000	cd5
			5d2676f0	4c74657200000000	04	000000	954cfc6f	00000000	6f1




Abstract fields
to decontextualize messages





Message format model



Allows multiple partitionment strategies per symbols




Full message format model




Interlude

'cauze +/- 60 slides left




Lets's do 5 minutes of knitting



Transformations

How to handle Encoded values (XOR, ASN.1) ?




How to handle
Encrypted values
(symmetric, asymmetric, ...) ?



Messages include **Transformed Fields**


Let's use « **Transformation Functions** »



The idea

Transform raw bytes into application-level bytes


- ▶ Applied either on messages, layers or fields
- ▶ Provided functions (base64, gzip, bz2, ...)
- ▶ Allow custom transformation functions



The idea

Transform raw bytes into application-level bytes


- ▶ Applied either on messages, **layers** or fields
- ▶ Provided functions (base64, gzip, bz2, ...)
- ▶ Allow custom transformation functions



The idea

Transform raw bytes into application-level bytes


- ▶ Applied either on messages, **layers** or fields
- ▶ Provided functions (base64, gzip, bz2, ...)
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The idea

Transform raw bytes into application-level bytes

- ▶ Applied either on messages, **layers** or fields
- ▶ Provided functions (base64, gzip, bz2, ...)
- ▶ Allow **custom** transformation functions



Adding a custom transformation function


Ex: ZeroAccess XOR-based obfuscation

[Create a Custom Transformation Function](#)

 **Custom Transformation Function**

Name of the function

```
key=0x66747032
result = []
binMessage = binascii.a2b_hex(message)
for i in range(0,len(binMessage), 4):
    if len(binMessage[i:])>=5 :
        subData = struct.unpack("<I", binMessage[i:i+4])[0]
        xoredSubData = subData ^ key
        result.append(struct.pack("<I", xoredSubData))
        key = ((key << 1) & 0xffffffffL | key >> 31)
strMessage = ".join(result)
message = binascii.b2a_hex(strMessage)
```



Adding a custom transformation function

Ex: ZeroAccess XOR-based obfuscation

b59e6155	28948dbec9c0d1998381a333	ad4d699b	4c068ece
4adb017b	28948dbec9c0d1998381a333	9b72a59a	4c068ece
8c43c72c	28948dbec9c0d1998381a333	d9fcb898	4c068ece




87ee1533	4c7465720000000010000000	8b4e2efc	00000000
78ab751d	4c7465720000000010000000	bd71e2fd	00000000
be33b34a	4c7465720000000010000000	ffffffffff	00000000



Search for relations




How to handle
when the **value depends** on something ?




Binary ID, Affiliate ID,
Filenames, *etc.*


« Inter-Symbol » and « Intra-Symbol » relations



« Inter-Symbol » and « **Intra-Symbol** » relations




Size Fields, CRCs, *etc.*




The idea

- ▶ **Correlate** field's size and values with the « Maximal Information Coefficient » (M.I.N.E.)
- ▶ Qualify correlated fields



The idea

- ▶ **Correlate** field's size and values with the « Maximal Information Coefficient » (M.I.N.E.)
- ▶ **Qualify** correlated fields




Generate Pairs of data for each field :

Simple way :

- ▶ **Value** of each field
- ▶ **Size** of each dynamic field


Add more :

- ▶ Concat fields
- ▶ Create n-grams (4bits, 8bits, ...)
- ▶ Consider CRCs, MD5, SHA1,



Search for closest pairs

- ▶ Measure **dependences** between each pairs
 - ▶ Support noisy datasets
- ▶ Rank pairs by their score




$\text{MINE}(\text{Value}(F1), \text{Size}(F2)) = 1$

→ Typical Size Field Relation

$\text{MINE}(\text{Value}(F7), \text{CRC32}(\text{Value}(F1), \text{Value}(F2))) = 1$

→ Typical CRC Relation




$\text{MINE}(\text{Value(F1)}, \text{Size(F2)}) = 1$


→ Typical Size Field Relation

$\text{MINE}(\text{Value(F7)}, \text{CRC32}(\text{Value(F1)}, \text{Value(F2)})) = 1$

→ Typical CRC Relation



« Environmental » dependencies




During packets capture:

- ▶ Retrieve **contextual** data (IP, port, timestamp, etc.)
- ▶ Store them as meta-data

During vocabulary inference:

- ▶ **Search for meta-data** in messages




Step 3 : RE grammar

Sequence of valid exchanged symbols.
→ IO Automata





Sequence of valid exchanged symbols.



→ IO Automata





But answers depends on the environment



Our model (SMMDT)
→ Add probabilities on output messages





Our model (SMMDT)
→ Add the « reaction time »





Active Grammatical Inference Process

→ Angluin L*^a Algorithm



Active Grammatical Inference Process

→ Angluin L^{*}a Algorithm






Generating traffic...

Netzob can generate traffic that:

- Follows the **inferred message format**
- Respects the **state machine**



Emulation of different kind of actors and flows

- Client ↔ Real server implementation
- Server ↔ Real client implementation
- Both client(s) and server

Create Network Actor

Create a Network Actor

General Informations

ID	d544669c-b30e-46b8-a67c-4d8b15b09!
Name	zeroAccessBot
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Initiator	


Network Configuration

Type	CLIENT
Predefined Values	
L4_PROTOCOL	UDP
BIND_IP	192.168.42.41
BIND_PORT	1
TARGET_IP	115.22.87.69
TARGET_PORT	16464

Distinction between

- Client / server
- Initiator / responder of the opening channel

*Ex : TLS with TCP session initiated
by the server*




Abstraction from the communication channel

TCP messages

USB channel


IPC flow

Raw file





Memory mechanism



- Some received values are **memorized**...
- ...and **reinjected** in future messages
- Also handles contextual values (IP, time, etc.)




Abstraction and contextualization principles





Abstraction and contextualization principles





Abstraction and contextualization principles



Abstraction and contextualization principles



Abstraction and contextualization principles




FINAL BATTLE

Demos

DEMOS

Demo 1: reversing the protocol of ZA


- Import samples of communications
- De-obfuscate exchanges
- Find similar messages
- Split messages in fields
- Abstract Fields
- Search for relations



DEMOS

Demo 2: retrieve the P2P zombie directory


- Simulation of a realistic zombie
- Map the peers neighbours relations



Future improvements
of Netzob...


Integrated smart fuzzing, by leveraging the simulator engine

→ Allows to fuzz undocumented and proprietary protocols




Integrated smart fuzzing, by leveraging the simulator engine

→ Allows to fuzz undocumented and proprietary protocols



Support of more communication channels


- ▶ USB
- ▶ IOCTL
- ▶ API (ssl_read, ssl_write, etc.)



Export protocol model in more 3rd party products (*coming soon*)

- ▶ Wireshark
- ▶ Scapy
- ▶ Peach Fuzzer


Allows protocol dissection with established tools



Export protocol model in more 3rd party products (*coming soon*)

- ▶ Wireshark
- ▶ Scapy
- ▶ Peach Fuzzer


Allows fuzzing of unknown protocols with well-known tools






Conclusion...

- ▶ Protocol RE automation domain is quite active at the academic level
- ▶ But **no real tool available...**
- ▶ Netzob tries to fill this lack by
 - ▶ Supporting academic researches
 - ▶ Being **usable in operational context**



- ▶ Open to all kind of contributions

- ▶ Feedback
- ▶ Bug fix
- ▶ Feature proposal / implementation
- ▶ Translation
- ▶ ...



Thanks for your attention !

Any questions ?

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


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