

## **Berlin Institute of Technology**

FG Security in Telecommunications



# Let Me Answer That for You!

#### adventures in mobile paging

29<sup>th</sup> Chaos Communication Congress (29c3)

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## Agenda


- GSM architecture introduction
- Introduction to mobile paging
- Attacking paging
- Attacking large areas
- Conclusions



- GSM has been beaten almost to death ;)
- Still one of the most relevant mobile telephony standards!
- Problems may affect other protocols: 3G, LTE, ...
- It's fun to play with radio!




## GSM network infrastructure (simplified)





## Introduction to paging

- Paging Channel (PCH) broadcast downlink channel on the CCCH
- PCH used by network for service notification
- Paging message carries Mobile Identity (TMSI/IMSI)
- Each phone compares its identity and reacts
- Again, this information is broadcast!
- Can we abuse this knowledge? ;D



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
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## Mobile Terminated (MT) service delivery


- Mobile phones idle most of the time
  - $\rightarrow$  not in constant contact with the network
  - $\rightarrow$  saves battery
- So which BTS should transmit the signal?
- Mobile networks needs to determine the phone's location
- Visitor Location Register (VLR) handles subscribers that are within a specific geographical area



What happens when you call or text someone?




What happens when you call or text someone?



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
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


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


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


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


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
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


BTS










Immediate Assignment (AGCH)







Immediate Assignment (AGCH)

Tune to allocated channel









## Hijacking the service?

- Evil hackers can't just impersonate subscribers here
  - Well more on that later...
- Authentication and cipher information stored on the SIM card
- But what happens if we respond with wrong information or not at all?
  - → channels are dropped, no service delivered (call, SMS) :(



## Paging Attack

- We have a race condition!
- GSM protocols are driven by complex state machines
- State changes after:
  - Receiving paging response
  - Channel dropping
- Can we respond to other peoples paging messages?
- Can we do that faster?
- Will the network expect a 2nd paging response?
- We could do that from any BTS in the same area!



## Paging Attack - What exactly is fast?

- Speed influences by many things
  - Weather
  - Radio signal quality
  - Network saturation
  - ....
- But mostly the **baseband** implementation!
  - Layer{1,2,3} queuing and scheduling



## Paging Attack – implementing a fast baseband

- Free Software/Open Source mobile baseband firmware: OsmocomBB
  - Runs on cheap hardware (e.g. cheap Motorola C123)
  - Mobile phone application exists (but runs on PC!)
    - $\rightarrow$  not fast at all :/
- Completely implemented as Layer1 firmware
  - Ported Layer2/Layer3 to Layer1
  - Runs solely on the phone  $\rightarrow$  very fast
- Listens to messages on the PCH
- Can react to IMSIs/TMSIs or TMSI ranges
- Sends paging response messages
- Performs invalid ciphering/auth





## Paging Attack - Measuring paging response speed


- Relevant baseband stacks: Qualcomm, Intel (Infineon), Texas Instruments, ST-Ericsson, Renesas (Nokia), Marvell, Mediatek
- USRP + Modified OpenBTS version logs:
  - Time for Paging Request ↔ Channel request
  - Time for Paging Request ↔ Paging response
- Hookup phones to test BTS
- Send 200 SMS to each phone
- Measure





## Paging Attack - How fast is the "average" phone?

#### Time measurements for each baseband



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
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## Paging Attack - Practice results

- OsmocomBB layer23 (modified mobile application) is too slow
- Small layer1 only implementation can win the race!

→ DoS against Mobile Terminated services

- Tested all German operators:
  - Vodafone
  - O2 (Telefonica)
  - E-Plus
  - T-Mobile
    - $\rightarrow$  all vulnerable to this attack





#### DEMO – DoS





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## Getting victim mobile identities

- You don't necessarily have to (why not just react to every paging?)
- Network paging with IMSIs:
  - 3rd party HLR lookups provide number  $\rightarrow$  IMSI mapping
- For TMSIs:
  - Monitor PCH with OsmocomBB phone
  - Call victim, drop call early (3.7 seconds on O2)
    - $\rightarrow$  phone will not ring, but being paged!
  - Or use silent SMS
  - Rinse and repeat
    - $\rightarrow$  Evaluate monitored data

*"Location leaks over the GSM air interface"*, Kune et al., NDSS 2012 *"Wideband GSM Sniffing"*, Munaut & Nohl, 2010



## Hijacking delivery – Encryption

- We need Kc for encrypted communication!
- Some networks use  $A5/0 \rightarrow No$  encryption
- Some networks use A5/2  $\rightarrow$  Broken (1999)
- Most use A5/1  $\rightarrow$  Broken (e.g. 26C3/27C3)
  - Kraken + OsmocomBB phones/airprobe can crack session key (Kc) in seconds
- Not many A5/3 networks due to phone implementations



## Paging Attack cont. – Authentication

- 50% of networks authenticate MT (SMS/call) 10% of the time (referring to Security Research Labs)
- Operators care about MO because of billing!
- However, MT indirectly affects billing
- Most MT service deliveries not authenticated

Incomplete authentication allows MT hijacking
 → Our code can handle a known session key/encryption





## DEMO – Hijacking SMS





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#### Broken Authentication - O2

- When receiving authentication request, attacker does not respond
- When victim does, attacker channel also authenticated
  → next step is ciphering
- Network seems to only know about authenticated subscriber
  - Not authenticated channel!
- Phone's can easily be forced to authenticate by causing paging ;)
- For those interested: http://pastie.org/private/jbp1yji4f0i2ara2awkq



- VLRs handle larger geographical areas (Location Area)
- Paging broadcasted on all BTSs for that area
  → we don't need to camp on the same BTS
- Respond to all paging requests faster for Location Area
  → DoS to all subscribers in that area



#### How large is a Location Area?


- Location Area Code broadcast on the BCCH
- 2 people + GPS loggers + OsmocomBB cell\_log phones + car :)



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#### Location Areas – Berlin/Vodafone





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
## Attacking Location Areas cont.

- Non-city LAs larger (and fewer) than for cities
  - Seen 1000 km<sup>2</sup>
- Location Areas are huge even in cities!
  - 100 500 km<sup>2</sup> in Berlin
  - Cover whole city districts
- For Mobile Terminated: Paging DoS way more effective than jamming
- Feasibility depends on paging activity



#### **Attacking Location Areas - Activity**

- We can camp on location areas and log paging
- Measured all 4 operators over 24 hours, same time and location



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## DoS + Paging activity reduction

- Paging attack stops initial service delivery
- We don't want to answer every time in the future
- IMSI DETACH attack by Sylvain Munaut
- Phone detach signal to network
  - → Mobile Terminated services not delivered until re-attach
- Detach message contains mobile identity
  - $\rightarrow$  send paging response, send detach message
  - $\rightarrow$  watch paging reducing over time



- For a small operator (E-Plus) 415 TMSIs in paging / minute
- Vodafone even 1200! (But paging twice)
- We are not that fast!
  - Resynchronization takes time
- Paging response is on a dedicated channel
  - PCH not visible during attack
  - $\rightarrow$  Definitely not feasible with one phone



## Attacking Location Areas cont.

These phones are cheap though (5-20 €)





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## Conclusions

- Attacking single subscribers and Location Areas is practical!
- MT services need 100% authentication
- Active attackers (malicious phones) need to be considered by standardization bodies



## Thank you for your attention!

- Also thanks to these people:
  - Dmitry Nedospasov
  - Dieter Spaar
  - Holger Freyther
  - Harald Welte
  - Tobias Engel
  - Osmocom community!

- Disclaimer:
  - Don't do this at home...
    - ... or only with your own SIM cards!



## **Questions?**

- Source code will be published, stay tuned check http://nion.modprobe.de/blog/ after new year.
- Poke me if I forget
  - nico@sec.t-labs.tu-berlin.de
  - @iamnion



