# Oops, I hacked my PBX Why auditing proprietary protocols matters

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#### December 29, 2011

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2 Reverse engineering the protocol

3 Actual results



Foreword Why did I hack the PBX

### A few words in beforehand

- Don't laugh too loud, YOU could have made this mistakes too!
- A real world example is used but slightly obfuscated

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Foreword Why did I hack the PBX

# Why did I hack the PBX?

#### • I didn't want to, seriously!

- Phones with PBX integration can be customized
- Client has >50 of them
- 5 Minutes/Phone to read-modify-write, non scriptable!

- They restructured  $\Rightarrow$  Reconfigure all phones
- $\bullet \Rightarrow$  Massive acceptance problems with the admin

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Getting started Understand the original software Dump the communication Analyze your dumps

# Things you will need

#### • The original software

- Some PBX hardware to tinker with
- Wireshark
- Your brain
- Too much (client) time on your hands

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Period States, Deprint | 1. April 10

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### Understand the original software

#### • Poke around the interface

- You might find gems ;)
- Try to think behind the GUI



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e	<ul> <li>Debug</li> <li>Check Properties</li> <li>Check V24 Fern</li> <li>Check InitValues</li> <li>Check Transfermode allgemein</li> <li>Check Translatormode</li> <li>Zeige programminternen Dialoge an</li> </ul>

Getting started Understand the original software Dump the communication Analyze your dumps

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Getting started Understand the original software **Dump the communication** Analyze your dumps

## Dump the communication

#### Define test cases

- Enable debug output
- Repeat test cases while sniffing
- File cleanly

#### Simple test case

- Launch Software
- Olick on ,,Load"
- Olick on ,,From phone"

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- Select phone
- Enter password
- Watch download

Getting started Understand the original software **Dump the communication** Analyze your dumps

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Getting started Understand the original software Dump the communication Analyze your dumps

# Analyze your dumps

- Correllate debug data and dump with test case
- Make sense of data flow
- Look at hexdumps
- Look for known data



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Protocol basics Communication flow Where is the authentication gone?

### **Protocol basics**

#### • Header contains packet length

- Each packet to PBX triggers a reponse
- Packet type of a positive ACK is the one of the request +1
- Has virtual channels
- Has an idle timeout!

C1:	ient	5								PB	K						
05	21	00	00	00	00					05	22	00	00	12	e0		
09	21	00	00	00	00	00	60	00	16	1f	22	00	00	12	00	00	60
										00	16	40	43	90	14	e0	00
										00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00
										00	90	00	00	00	00	00	00
08	81	01	01	00	63	02	00	00		07	82	01	01	02	6b	01	7c

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											00	16	40	43	90	14	e0	00
											00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00
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Client		PBX
05 21 00 00 00 00		05 22 00 00 12 e0
09 21 00 00 00 00 00 60	00 16	1f 22 00 00 12 00 00 60
		00 16 40 43 90 14 e0 00
		00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
		00 90 00 00 00 00 00 00
08 81 01 01 00 63 02 00	00	07 82 01 01 02 6b 01 7c

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										00	16	40	43	90	14	e0	00
										00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00
										00	90	00	00	00	00	00	00
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										00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00
										00	90	00	00	00	00	00	00
08	81	01	01	00	63	02	00	00		07	82	01	01	02	6b	01	7c

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Protocol basics Communication flow Where is the authentication gone?

#### Communication flow

#### Find out packet types

- Explore the communication sequence
- Find the authentication sequence.

Name	Value
HELLO	0x21
READ_NVRAM	0x31
WRITE_NVRAM	0x33
CHAN_OPEN	0x81
CHAN_CLOSE	0x85
INQUIRE_HARDWARE	0x87
PING	0x79

#### Note

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These apply to all devices in the system, Phones and PBXe

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Protocol basics Communication flow Where is the authentication gone?

#### Communication flow

- Find out packet types
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- Find the authentication sequence.

Count	Chan	Туре
1x	0	HELLO
1x	0	READ_NVRAM
1x	1	CHAN_OPEN
20x	1	INQUIRE_HW
1x	1	READ_NVRAM
1x	1	INQUIRE_HW
1x	1	PING
1x	2	CHAN_OPEN
1x	2	INQUIRE_HW
nx	2	READ_NVRAM
1x	2	CHAN_CLOSE
1x	1	CHAN_CLOSE
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#### Communication flow

- Find out packet types
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   Wait: No auth done?!

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20x	1	INQUIRE_HW
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Protocol basics Communication flow Where is the authentication gone?

#### Where is the authentication gone?

#### Launch Software

- Olick on "Load"
- Click on "From phone"
- Select phone
- Enter password ("012345")
- Watch download

Step	Count	Chan	Туре
	1x	0	HELLO
3	1x	0	READ_NVRAM
5	1x	1	CHAN_OPEN
	20x	1	INQUIRE_HW
4	1x	1	READ_NVRAM
4	1x	1	INQUIRE_HW
5	1x	1	PING
	1x	2	CHAN_OPEN
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6	nx	2	READ_NVRAM
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# Where is the authentication gone?

- A short READ\_NVRAM
- Reads some binary gibberish
- Original software shows an auth-window
- Or was it...

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Client :	_09_	31	01 0	02 00	00 00	A0 2	24_06	
PBX :		Type 32		02 02		ddr A0 1	Len 24_06_86	5 87 84 85 82 83
	Len	Туре	Chan		A	ddr	Len	Surprise
		86	87	84	85	82	83	
	XOR	<i>B</i> 6	<i>B</i> 6					
	=	30	31	32	33	34	35	

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I DA .	$\sim$	Type	$\sim$	,2 02,		ddr	Len	Surprise	<u>,                                    </u>
		86	87	84	85	82	83		
	XOR	<i>B</i> 6	<i>B</i> 6						
	=	30	31	32	33	34	$35 \Rightarrow 35$	'012345''	

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The story so far What could happen. And now? Lessons learned The End

The story so far – But how could it happen?

#### • Authentication neither neccessary nor useful

- No privilege system implemented
- Many commands useful for debugging
- $\Rightarrow$  Maybe a developers interface?

The story so far What could happen. And now? Lessons learned The End

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# What could happen..

• Read/Write any phone

- Reset PBX password
- Really bad stuff: Read/Write firmware



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The story so far What could happen.. And now? Lessons learned The End



#### Contact the vendor

- Be nice, they will be too!
- Help them improve!
- Carry on and find more bugs!

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The story so far What could happen.. And now? Lessons learned The End



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The story so far What could happen.. And now? Lessons learned The End

#### Lessons learned

#### • Anchor authentication/encryption in protocol

- Do not use debugging interfaces in production
- Audit your codebase once in a while
- Shannon was right..
- Vendors are happy to be informed (at least good ones)

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The story so far What could happen.. And now? Lessons learned **The End** 

# Thank you for your attention

Any Questions?

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