

2503: Nothing to hide

Full-Disk-Encryption Crash-Course
– Everything to hide –

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Introducing myself

- I studied Computer Science at Georgia Tech and Information Assurance at Norwich University
- I work as an IT-Security consultant at Akkaya Consulting GmbH in Cologne (Köln), Germany
- I like to play Rugby, but my ambitious playing days are over

„Okay, what are we looking at and why are we looking at it?“ - MST3K

- What: Full-Disk-Encryption
 - Hardware solutions (some quick notes)
 - Software solutions
- Why: Data stored on mobile devices is exposed to unauthorized physical access (loss/theft).


Full-Disk-Encryption

- Encrypts (almost) every bit on your disk ...
 - ... through hardware (these are the quick notes)
 - USB/Firewire HDD with cryptographic controller (fingerprint/PIN authentication, ...)
 - HDD provides cryptographic controller (ATA security)
 - ... through software
 - Operating system component, works transparently
 - Negligible every-day performance impact (depends mostly on CPU)

Architecture: Pre-Boot-Authentication

- Loaded by BIOS from unencrypted storage
 - Linux: boot partition with init-RamDisk (/boot)
 - Windows: (proprietary) pre-boot environment
- Reads in the cryptographic key for encrypted disks
 - Password, smart-card, ...
- Loads operating system from disk
 - Linux: filesystem on encrypted device is mounted
 - Windows: interrupt 13h is hooked (NTLDR uses int 13h)

Architecture: Encryption driver



- **Linux:** Device-mapper, device driver hooking, ...
- **Windows:** Lower-level filter driver
 - Key handoff from int 13h function (used for NTLDR)

Architecture: Initial encryption

➤ Linux

- Device-mapper: Only new filesystems can be created on encrypted device
- Device driver hooking: Available as proprietary software (with support for in-place encryption)

➤ Windows

- Lower-level filter driver: In-place („on-the-fly“) encryption is a standard feature

Solutions (1/2)

- Windows: Commercial software
 - CE-Infosys CompuSec (also available for Linux)
 - CheckPoint FDE (also available for Linux & OSX)
 - PGP WDE
 - Safenet ProtectDrive
 - Secude FinallySecure
 - Utimaco Safeguard Easy/Enterprise
 - Windows Vista BitLocker

Solutions (2/2)

- **Windows: Open-Source Software**
 - TrueCrypt
 - DiskCryptor
- **Linux**
 - Device encrypted filesystems (LUKS/dm-crypt)
 - Cryptographic filesystems¹
 - Stacked filesystems¹

¹Only mentioned for completeness, not relevant to focus of presentation

Risks

- Weak passwords
 - About 6 bits of entropy per password character, but cryptographic keys are usually 128 or 256 bit
- Cold-boot attacks
 - Requires powered-on computer system
- Coercion

Oddities

- TPM support != TPM support
 - Cryptographic key storage
 - Binding operating system to TPM chip
- Multi-disk support (not RAID)
 - Works great ...
 - ... except for when disks fail or new disks are installed
 - Decrypt all remaining (working) drives
 - Uninstall & reinstall software
 - Encrypt all drives

TrueCrypt

- Unique cryptographic features
- Multi-Platform compatible
- Unsuitable for most enterprise environments
 - No key management (preconfigurable recovery key, ...)
 - No user management (multiple users for PBA)
 - Very technical and somewhat confusing user interface

DiskCryptor

- Project created by russian developers
 - Still in development phase: current version is 0.4
 - DiskCryptor aims to be TrueCrypt compatible¹
- Unsuitable for most enterprise environments
 - No key management (preconfigurable recovery key, ...)
 - No user management (multiple users for PBA)
- No installer application

¹This will (unfortunately) change with version 0.5

DiskCryptor+AC


- Based on DiskCryptor
 - Includes an installer (and uninstaller) application
 - Installs software
 - Prompts user for drive selection for encryption
 - Prompts user for encryption password
 - Added user manuals (English and German)
- Future releases will remain TrueCrypt compatible (will fork under new name)

TrueCrypt: Volume layout

- Volume header
 - In-place encrypted system partition volume (512 bytes)
 - Header is encrypted: magic string („TRUE“), header version, ...
 - All other volumes
 - Volume header + hidden header & reserved area (128 Kb)
- Volume backup header (128 Kb)
 - Encryption key is derived from different salt value
 - Omitted for in-place encrypted system partition


TrueCrypt: Hidden volume

- **Decoy volumes:** Partition 1 (encrypted): Operating system
Partition 2 (encrypted): Data
- **Hidden volume:** Partition 2 (encrypted): Operating system/Data
(TrueCrypt driver emulates hidden volume as a disk partition when running the hidden OS)



TrueCrypt: In-place encryption

- TrueCrypt:
 1. Volume header is prepended (marked in red)
 2. Sectors are encrypted in-place
- DiskCryptor:
 1. Filesystem is shrunk
 2. Volume header is inserted (marked in red)
 3. Sectors are relocated & encrypted



Open-Source feature wishlist

- TrueCrypt compatible user and key management
 - TrueCrypt volume specifications are key agnostic ...
 - ... user and key management data must reside elsewhere
- Pre-Boot-Authentication environment
 - Storage implementations
 - Unallocated or „hidden“ sectors (Host-Protected-Area)
 - Unencrypted file on otherwise fully encrypted filesystem
 - Cryptographic key storage (TPM, HSM, Network, ...)
- Protection against cold-boot attacks

Full-Disk-Encryption Crash-Course

- Workshop: tomorrow from 19:00 to 20:00 in A03
- Thank you for your attention

Q & A

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